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ABSTRACT This paper estimates the distributional effects that would result from eliminating 
the differential tax treatment of business and personal income in the Chilean tax 
system, as well as from the elimination of the main personal income tax exemption, 
the one for voluntary retirement savings. The results of the analysis show that, 
while the majority of taxpayers benefitting from this exemption are in the upper 
income brackets, its elimination would not make the income tax more progressive. 
As to removing the favourable tax treatment for corporate income, the distributional 
effect is of relevant magnitude and the income tax becomes significantly more 
progressive. Generally speaking, the results suggest that income taxation in Chile 
is less progressive than it appears and that it is feasible to give it a more important 
redistributional role in reducing income inequality.
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The last 20 years have seen small changes in the levels 
of inequality prevailing in Chile, despite sustained 
economic growth and a sharp reduction in poverty.1 While 
there is evidence that government transfers have had an 
impact in reducing poverty and inequality (Agostini and 
Brown, 2000 and 2011), there is much disagreement in 
the public debate over the role that tax policy can play 
in reducing income inequality.
Evidence for the United States shows that a 
revenue-neutral tax reform can in fact make the income 
tax more progressive and can reduce income inequality. 
For example, using data from the 1994 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey, Metcalf (1999) shows that a tax 
reform in which the existing graduated tax is replaced 
by a uniform sales tax (equivalent to a value added tax, 
vat) that raises the same amount of revenue would be 
highly regressive. Specifically, if the income tax in force 
in 1988 had been replaced by a national sales tax of 
16.5%, the Suits index would have declined from 0.202 
(a progressive tax) to -0.286 (a regressive tax). Similarly, 
Altshuler, Harris and Toder (2010) estimate for the United 
States the distributional effects of a revenue-neutral tax 
reform that cuts corporate taxes (a regressive reduction) 
and at the same time raises the taxes paid by individuals 
on capital gains and dividends (a progressive increase). 
The net effect of the reform is progressive and reduces 
after-tax income inequality.
Even a flat tax with an exemption threshold can be 
progressive and can reduce after-tax income inequality. 
For example, using a dynamic general equilibrium model 
with household heterogeneity and a utilitarian steady-
state social welfare criterion, Conesa and Krueger (2006) 
show that the optimal income tax for the United States is 
well approximated by a flat tax rate of 17.2% and a fixed 
deduction of US$ 9,400. More generally, Davies and Hoy 
(2002) demonstrate that, with a given pre-tax income 
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1  Between 1990 and 2009 gross domestic product (gdp) per capita 
in Chile grew by 98% (World Indicators, World Bank). The poverty 
rate fell from 38.6% in 1990 to 15.1% in 2009. Indigence also dropped 
sharply in this period, from 13% to 3.7%. The Gini coefficient, on the 
other hand, was 0.56 in 1990 and 0.53 in 2000 (mideplan, 2010a and 
2010b).
distribution and a requirement to keep revenues constant, 
after-tax inequality will decline monotonically with the 
tax rate under a flat tax system in which the personal 
exemption level is adjusted to keep revenues constant.
Lastly, it is important to consider the evidence 
on taxpayers’ response to changing tax rates in terms 
of income reporting, in particular among high-income 
families. Lindsey (1987) finds that the reduction in the 
top marginal tax rate (from 70% to 50%) introduced by 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 in the United 
States was associated with a significant increase in the 
portion of income reported by the top 1% of taxpayers. 
Feenberg and Poterba (1993) also show that the stable 
increase in the portion of gross taxable income received 
by the richest 0.5% of the population since 1970 is 
consistent with taxpayers’ responses to the tax rate cuts 
for high-income families during that time. A time series 
analysis by Slemrod (1996), designed to isolate the 
nontax factors of inequality shows evidence consistent 
with tax cuts increasing the incomes of wealthy families. 
Kleven and Schultz (2011), using data from Denmark, 
found that the elasticity of taxable income is greater for 
high than for low incomes. 
In the specific case of Chile, several characteristics 
of the income tax explain its limited role in reducing 
inequality (Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz, 1999). The 
income tax accounts for around a third of total tax revenues 
and, although it includes income from all sources, it treats 
the income of individuals differently from corporate 
income. The tax rate on corporate profits is only 17% 
when the profits are not distributed to the owners.2 In 
the case of certain small businesses, no corporate taxes 
are due as long as the profits are not distributed.3 When 
profits are distributed, the corporate tax already paid is 
considered a credit against the personal income tax.4 
2  In order to finance the reconstruction plan following the 2010 
earthquake, this tax rate was raised temporarily to 20% in 2011 and 
18.5% in 2012. After extensive debate, the national Congress approved 
a tax adjustment proposed by the government, setting a permanent 
tax rate of 20%, which is to come into force in 2013.
3  60% of firms fall under the general tax regime based on accrued 
earnings, and 40% have a special regime based on distributed profits 
or presumed income (Jorrat, 2009).
4 In contrast to Chile, business profits in the United States pay 
corporate taxes first and the owners of the firm then pay personal 
taxes on the dividends received from the firm without any credit for 
the corporate taxes already paid. A portion of the retained profits is 
I
Introduction
c e p a l  r e v i e w  1 0 8  •  d e c e m b e r  2 0 1 2
distributional effects of eliminating the differential tax treatment of business and  
personal income in chile • claudio a. agostini, claudia martínez a. and barbara flores
177
For example, if a firm has profits of 100 Chilean pesos 
(Ch$ 100), it will pay Ch$ 17 in corporate taxes. Let us 
assume that the firm subsequently distributes Ch$ 50 in 
dividends to each of the owners, and that those persons, 
after totalling their income including dividends, are 
liable for Ch$ 20 in personal income tax. The tax paid 
by the firm then constitutes a credit against their personal 
income tax, so that in the end they have to pay only 
Ch$ 11.50 ($20 - 0.5*$17).
If all profits were distributed, this mechanism would 
not generate any problem in terms horizontal tax equity. 
However, data from the Internal Revenue Service show 
that less than 30% of corporate profits are distributed 
each year (Jorrat, 2009).
In addition, there are two special tax regimes under 
which corporate profits are taxed only when they are 
distributed.5 The objective of these special regimes is to 
provide liquidity to small businesses.6 However, they can 
also be used by small investment companies owned by 
a family group whose members can shift their personal 
income to corporate income. Empirical evidence shows 
that 52% of all retained earnings in Chile in 2006 are 
reported in family firms of this type, the owners of which 
belong to the highest income decile and make wide use 
of these special tax regimes (Jorrat, 2009).7
A second specific feature of the Chilean tax system 
is the high level of tax-exempted income, which is well 
above the average wage. This high level, together with 
a skewed income distribution, implies that few people 
actually pay income taxes. In 2009, 82.7% of taxpayers 
had incomes below the exemption threshold and, therefore, 
did not have to pay income tax. As a consequence, all 
the tax exemptions and incentives contained in the 
income tax benefit the top 17% of income earners 
in the country. Despite this, and notwithstanding the 
apparent public concern over inequality, recent years 
also taxed a second time when the owners of the firm obtain capital 
gains from these retained earnings.
5  Articles 14bis and 14ter of the Income Tax Act. Under the article 
14bis tax regime firms pay taxes only when profits are distributed. To 
be eligible for this tax regime a firm must have annual income of less 
than 5,000 utm (until 2008 the cutoff was 3,000 utm) and an initial 
capital of less than 1,000 utm (200 utm until 2008). Under the article 
14ter tax regime, firms pay tax on the basis of cash flow, and they are 
allowed to keep simplified accounts and to deduct investments and 
inventories as expenses. To be eligible, a firm must collect and pay 
vat, it must have annual income of less than 5,000 utm on average 
for the last three fiscal years (3,000 utm until 2008) and an initial 
capital of less than 6,000 utm.
6  Firms with annual sales of less than Ch$ 127 million (around US$ 
270,000) or with capitalization below Ch$ 7.5 million (equivalent to 
US$ 16,600) can use these special regimes.
7  77.9% of all retained earnings belong to the highest income decile.
have seen an increase in the number of personal income 
tax exemptions designed to serve a variety of purposes 
(encouraging general savings and retirement savings, 
housing purchases, hybrid automobile purchases, 
purchase and installation of solar panels in dwellings, 
etc.), and Congress is now considering several additional 
incentives and exemptions.
According to statistics from the Chilean Internal 
Revenue Service (dipres, 2009), tax expenditures 
amounted to around 5.72% of gdp in 2010, and the main 
component of that expenditure (4.90% of gdp) is related 
to the income tax. The main source of tax expenditure is 
tax deferral (4.03% of gdp), which represents an amount 
almost equal to the total revenue collected through the 
income tax. Consequently, eliminating the deferral 
provision has the potential of nearly doubling income 
tax revenues. Among the various tax mechanisms for 
postponing the payment of income tax, the most important 
in terms of magnitude are undistributed profits (2.01%) 
and distributed profits reinvested before 20 days (0.94%).
This paper describes and analyses the impact that 
the voluntary retirement savings (Ahorro Previsional 
Voluntario, apv) exemption and the deferred payment of 
corporate income taxes have on the progressive nature of 
the income tax. To this end, data from the Chilean Internal 
Revenue Service (sii) and from the casen (National 
Socioeconomic Survey) are used. Both the apv and the 
corporate profits tax deferral were discussed as potential 
sources of revenue for financing the reconstruction effort 
following the 2010 earthquake, but no agreement was 
reached on eliminating these tax benefits.
The results show that the apv, although it is used 
by the highest income groups, has little impact in terms 
of making the income tax less progressive. However, the 
distributional effects of corporate profit tax deferral are 
indeed important. A shift in the tax base from “distributed 
profits” to “accrued profits”, while maintaining the 
corporate tax credit for purposes of the individual income 
tax, makes the income tax significantly more progressive 
and raises the average tax rate paid by those with the 
highest incomes.
Previous studies have shown contrasting results 
with respect to this last point. On the one hand, Engel, 
Galetovic and Raddatz (1999), for example, find that 
this kind of change has no effect on the scanty impact 
of taxation on income distribution. They conclude 
that only targeted social spending can be effective in 
redistributing income. The main reason is that incomes 
across all deciles are very low and the average tax rate 
is barely 3%. It is important to highlight that in their 
study these authors used data from the casen survey, 
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and consequently incomes for the higher deciles are 
underreported and the distributional effect of the 
income tax is therefore underestimated. Moreover, 
the authors assume that corporate profits are not 
distributed to the firm’s owners, which also limits the 
potential redistributional power of the income tax. 
On the other hand, Cantallops, Jorrat any Scherman 
(2007), using sii data, show that a revenue-neutral tax 
reform that eliminates both income tax exemptions and 
special tax regimes for corporate profits and reduces 
the value added tax (vat) would make the tax system 
more progressive and would contribute substantially 
to improving income distribution in Chile. In this case, 
taxing the retained profits of the firm’s owners plays 
a key role in the outcome.
This paper uses sii data to analyse the impact of 
the apv exemption and the casen survey as the basis for 
examining the impact of a change in the corporate profits 
tax base. For the latter analysis, data equivalent to those 
employed by Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz (1999) are 
used, whereas the simulations in this study explicitly 
consider the distribution of profits to firm owners.
The paper then proceeds as follows. Section II looks 
in greater detail at the income tax in Chile, with particular 
emphasis on the current apv exemption. Section III 
presents the two databases used in the subsequent empirical 
analysis. Section IV analyses the distributional effect 
of the main existing exemptions and the mechanism for 
deferring corporate taxes. Finally, section V summarizes 
the principal findings and conclusions.
II
the chilean tax system
1.  general description
Tax revenue represents the main source of funding for 
the Chilean State, and generates around 70% of its total 
revenue. In 2010, net tax revenue represented 13.6% 
of gdp.8 Of that amount, 53.6% was generated by the 
value added tax (vat), 10.4% by specific excise taxes 
(on fuels, alcohol, cigarettes and tobacco), 32.2% by the 
income tax and the remaining 3.8% by taxes on legal 
transactions and foreign trade.
Since January 2013,9 the income tax has a single 
permanent rate of 20% for corporate profits and a 
7-bracket structure of marginal tax rates, plus an 
exemption threshold, for personal income. As noted 
above, the corporate tax rate does not determine the 
final tax burden on corporate profits, as the corporate 
tax is integrated with the personal income tax. The 
corporate tax is just a withholding tax from personal 
taxable income, and when profits are distributed among 
shareholders or owners of the firm, the dividends received 
constitute part of the personal tax base: they are added 
to all other income received, and individuals pay tax 
according to the tax bracket in which their income level 
8 In 2008 this figure was 18.5% and the average for the period 
2004-2008 was 17.4%, indicating that tax revenues were particularly 
low in 2009. 
9 The tax rate, which was 17% until 2010, was temporarily fixed at 
20% for 2011 and at 18.5% for 2012.
places them. For these purposes, corporate taxes paid in 
advance by the firm constitute a credit against personal 
taxes. In this respect, the corporate tax serves merely as 
a withholding of the personal tax that must ultimately 
be paid by the owners of the firm. However, there are 
two special tax regimes for small businesses that allow 
profits to be taxed only when they are withdrawn by the 
owners. In these cases, there is no 20% withholding from 
the accrued profits for each year. The tax expenditure 
inherent in deferring taxes until profits are distributed 
to the owners is estimated at 2.01% of gdp for the year 
2010 (dipres, 2009).
The seven brackets of the personal income tax 
have marginal rates that range from 5% to 40%. The 
exemption threshold is such that 83.42% of taxpayers 
did not have to pay income tax in 2009.10 Moreover, 
10.8% of taxpayers are in the first income tax bracket 
and pay a marginal rate of 5%. As a result, only 5.78% of 
taxpayers face a marginal rate of 10% or more. When it 
comes to the highest marginal rate of 40%, only 0.22% of 
taxpayers are in this income bracket, meaning that, while 
the marginal rate of 40% may be considered relatively 
high compared to other countries in Latin America, in 
practice it applies to fewer than 1% of individuals.
10  The exemption threshold was 508,302 pesos per month in the 
2009 tax year, equivalent to US$ 908. This exemption threshold is 
higher than the average income in Chile, which was 269,921 pesos 
per month, equivalent to US$ 482.
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Figure 1 shows the marginal tax rates in each 
bracket and the total number of taxpayers subject to 
those rates. It can be seen that the largest proportion of 
taxpayers face a marginal tax rate equal to zero. In light 
of this, it is not surprising that empirical simulations 
have shown that the income tax system in Chile has 
little redistributional power and that, in global terms, 
the tax system is slightly regressive (Engel, Galetovic 
and Raddatz, 1999).11
11  According to the 2010 Budget Law, published by the Budget Office, 
the largest source of revenue is the value added tax (vat), which in 
that year accounted for 32% of total revenue (41% of tax revenue). In 
In general, the government can affect income 
distribution through progressive taxes and targeted 
spending. In practice, Chile has opted exclusively for 
the social spending route, while collecting taxes in 
the most efficient manner possible regardless of its 
distributional effects.12
light of this, and of the structure of the income tax, it is not surprising 
that the tax system is not progressive.
12  In the 2009 casen survey the Gini coefficient of autonomous income 
per capita is 0.55, but after monetary transfers from the government 
it drops to 0.53. 
FIGURE 1
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii).
The structure of the Chilean income tax generates 
a salient horizontal tax inequity by granting preferential 
treatment to corporate profits in comparison to income 
from work. As a consequence, two persons with identical 
incomes may face very different tax rates. A person who 
earns only labour income pays tax at a marginal rate that 
can be as high as 40%, while a person whose income 
derives solely from business pays only 20% until the 
profits are distributed. If the firm comes under the special 
distributed profits tax regime it pays no tax at all until 
the profits are withdrawn as dividends. Obviously, this 
tax gap produces incentives to create firms for the sole 
purpose of paying less tax, leaving all personal savings 
in the firm as tax-free retained profits (or subject to a 
tax rate of 20% in the case of large firms).
The horizontal inequity thus generated by the income 
tax could potentially be only temporary and limited to a 
financial gain of the cost of money over time, because 
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once the firm’s profits are distributed as dividends they 
are subject to income tax based on the tax bracket and the 
marginal tax rate on total income of the firm’s owner. In 
this respect, the scope of the inequity would be limited 
to the financial gain attributable to the deferral of tax 
payment. However, Jorrat (2009) shows that less than a 
third of corporate profits are distributed each year, and 
that there are many legal loopholes for withdrawing 
profits without ever paying taxes on them, implying that 
the horizontal inequity is not only persistent over time 
but is of substantially greater magnitude.13
A second source of horizontal inequity is tax 
evasion (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Slemrod, 2007), 
since a tax evader pays fewer taxes than a non-evader 
with the same income. In Chile, tax evasion is estimated 
at 30% for the corporate income tax and at 46% for the 
personal income tax. In the latter case, 92% of evasion 
comes from the distribution of profits and dividends to 
business owners (Jorrat, 2009).
At the same time, the Chilean tax system, like that in 
most countries, contains tax exemptions and credits with 
13 One way of withdrawing profits without paying tax is to generate 
expenses in the firm, which actually correspond to household 
consumption, e.g. through the purchase of automobiles and 4WD 
trucks or computers. Another alternative is to create debts artificially 
with related firms or to purchase all the shares of a related firm for 
a value that yields a tax-free capital gain. It is also possible to have 
children over the age of 18 as shareholders or partners: if they are 
not working, they can each withdraw amounts up to the tax-exempt 
threshold (around 6 million pesos a year).
multiple objectives.14 However, it must be considered that, 
given the high exemption threshold for the personal income 
tax, these exemptions generate distributional effects only 
for the top 17% of income earners, who are those able to 
take advantage of preferential tax treatment. In this paper, 
the focus is on the retirement savings exemption, known 
as the voluntary retirement saving (apv), which involves 
a tax expenditure equal to 0.06% of gdp (see table 1).
2.  voluntary retirement savings (APV)
The main purpose of this exemption is to increase 
retirement savings through voluntary contributions to their 
individual capitalization accounts. Chile has a pension 
system based on individual capitalization accounts and 
compulsory savings, with monthly contributions of 10% 
of salary and wages, up to a ceiling of 64.7 uf (Unidades 
de Fomento, an inflation-linked accounting unit).15 People 
can choose their pension fund manager (administradora 
de fondos de pensiones, afp) and the risk profile of the 
assets portfolio in which their funds are invested. These 
compulsory savings are exempted from personal income 
taxes; in fact they are part of a worker’s gross salary but 
are not considered in the tax base.
14  Table 1 shows the principal sources of tax expenditure in 2010.
15  Pension fund managers (afp) charge commissions to administer 
the compulsory retirement funds. For a description of the system, see 
Superintendencia de Pensiones (2003).
TABLE 1
Key items of tax expenditure in chile, 2010
Tax expenditure Millions of pesos Percentage of gdp
Retained business profits pay no tax 3 660 2.01
Treatment of income in the pension fund system 1 723 0.94
Distributed profits reinvested before 20 days pay no tax 646 0.35
Other temporary differences 400 0.22
Special credit for housing construction 377 0.21
Accelerated depreciation 332 0.18
vat exemption for health services 290 0.16
Housing rental income covered by DFL 2 250 0.14
vat exemption for education establishments 239 0.13
Leasing quotas 228 0.12
Special treatment for voluntary contributions, contractual deposits and the apv 54 0.06
Source: Subdirección de Estudios, Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii), September 2009.
Notes: 
1. Includes tax returns in foreign currency.
2. Excludes negative expenditure items and items corresponding to the observed average.
3. Using an exchange rate of 522.46 pesos per dollar, corresponding to the average observed for 2008.
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In 2002, the low replacement rates for pensioners in 
the system (39% for women and 58% for men, according 
to Berstein, Larraín and Pino, 2006) led to the creation 
of a tax incentive for additional voluntary contributions 
to individual capitalization accounts: the apv (voluntary 
retirement savings). Since October 2008, people using 
this benefit can choose between two tax alternatives. The 
first is a tax exemption for the voluntary contribution at 
the time it is made, i.e. the amount of the apv is deducted 
from taxable income. Voluntary contributions are deducted 
from taxable income up to a maximum of 50 uf per month 
(with a ceiling of 600 uf per year). Subsequently, when the 
funds are withdrawn, they become part of taxable income 
in the year in which they are withdrawn. If the funds are 
withdrawn after retirement age, the tax rate is that for the 
corresponding tax bracket in the regular personal income 
tax structure. If the funds are withdrawn before reaching 
that age, an additional tax of between 3% and 7% has to 
be paid, thereby penalizing the use of the funds for other 
than retirement purposes.
The second option, in contrast to the first, does 
not exempt the apv from the tax base in the year the 
contribution is made. The tax benefit materializes when 
the funds are withdrawn, at which time only the return 
to savings become part of taxable personal income. 
Moreover, the person receives a 15% contribution from 
the State, to a maximum of six Monthly Tax Units 
(utm) per year.
The two alternative tax incentives available are 
intended to boost the retirement savings of two different 
kinds of taxpayers. The first alternative benefits people 
who must pay personal income tax in the year in which 
they make the voluntary retirement contribution. The 
second alternative benefits individuals who are exempt 
from personal income tax at the time they make their 
contribution to their retirement fund account. This 
second option was created in 2008, six years after the 
creation of the apv.
Since the marginal income tax rates rise with the level 
of income, the apv tax benefit also rises with income, up 
to a ceiling. Therefore, when people with different income 
levels but with the same amount of apv are compared, 
the tax benefit that each receives as a fraction of their 
income is exactly that person’s marginal rate, provided 
the apv is less than the ceiling and the exemption does 
not bring the person into a lower income tax bracket. For 
example, if the apv is 200,000 pesos (around $ 450), the 
tax savings is 10,000 pesos for a person in a tax bracket 
where the marginal rate is 5%, and it is 80,000 pesos 
for a person in the 40% tax bracket.
Obviously, people who pay no income tax because 
they are exempt, as is the case for 82% of workers in 
Chile, will not benefit from this tax exemption. Exempted 
persons do receive a tax benefit under the second option 
described above, but only when they retire and not when 
they make the apv investment.
According to statistics from the Superintendency 
of Pensions, in December 2010 there were 827,574 apv 
accounts in the system, with an accumulated balance of 
1,000,817,424 pesos. The tax expenditure associated 




Two different sources of data are used for the empirical 
analysis of the distributional impact of the apv tax exemption 
and the preferential treatment of corporate profits.
First, data from the sii produced especially for this 
study are used. The sii has a policy of not providing 
individual taxpayer data, releasing only highly aggregated 
figures on revenues by type of tax.16 However, for purposes 
of this study the sii supplied data for the year 2007 at 
16  The sii has long held that Chilean law prohibits the disclosure 
of individual taxpayer data, even if the information is completely 
anonymous.
a substantially disaggregated level, calculating pre-tax 
income and the various exemptions used by taxpayers 
for 1000 income quantiles. These data allow a detailed 
analysis of the effects on tax progressivity of the main 
tax exemptions and credits in the personal income tax. 
Second, the National Socioeconomic Survey 
(casen) for the year 2003 is used.17 The data from 
that survey include the socioeconomic characteristics 
17  The 2006 and 2009 casen surveys, with the disaggregated income 
variables needed for this study, were not yet available while working 
on this study. 
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of household members, dwelling characteristics, the 
main durable goods in the household, and its different 
sources of income, including transfers received from 
the State.
The 2003 casen survey was conducted by the 
University of Chile for the Ministry of Planning and 
Cooperation (mideplan),18 but the data were subsequently 
adjusted by the Economic Commission for Latin American 
and Caribbean (eclac) using the national accounts as 
a reference. The adjustments are related primarily to 
the problems generated by the lack of income data for 
certain households and the under- or over-reporting of 
certain income sources in the sample.19
The casen survey uses a random multi-step sampling 
method with stratification. In the first step, each of the 
country’s 13 regions is divided into rural and urban 
zones and the primary sampling units are selected with 
probabilities proportionate to the population. In the 
second step, given the stratification, households are 
selected so that all of them have the same probability 
of being selected in the sample.20
18 The name of this entity was changed to Ministry of Social 
Development in October 2011.
19 While the adjustments made by eclac could have introduced 
some bias in the data, the evidence suggests that this did not happen 
(Contreras and Larrañaga, 1999). In any case, unadjusted data are 
simply not available.
20  The methodological framework is available at: http://www.mideplan.
cl/casen/pdf/Metodologia_%202003.pdf
Table 2 provides a statistical description of data 
from the 2003 casen survey. In the expanded sample 
there are 6,921,064 individuals with positive incomes.21 
The average autonomous income (excluding monetary 
transfers from the State) is Ch$ 311,803 (equivalent to 
US$ 660). Pre-tax income is calculated on the basis of 
each individual’s income as calculated in the survey, 
adjusted to replicate the income tax base. This adjustment 
requires consideration of components of autonomous 
income that are not part of the personal income tax base, 
such as the value of self-consumption, imputed housing 
income in the case of home ownership, rental income 
and presumed costs for income as self-employed.22
Once the pre-tax income of each individual is 
calculated, the structure of marginal tax rates by income 
bracket is applied and then each person’s tax liability 
estimated. The average income tax rate for persons in 
the casen survey is 0.5%, slightly below the average of 
0.6% in the sii data. Because the sample is nationally 
representative and the structure of the sample is 
considered when the average is calculated, the difference 
between the two average tax rates may indicate income 
tax avoidance and evasion or may simply reflect the 
fact that higher-income individuals are generally not 
21  The unexpanded sample covers 68,153 households containing 
257,077 individuals.
22  Pre-tax income using the casen is calculated as: autonomous 
income-self consumption-imputed rent-receipts not constituting income-
presumed expenses (up to the ceiling allowed for the self-employed).
TABLE 2








Independent income 6 921 064 311 803 757 864 46 80 000 000
Self-consumption 6 921 064 1 070 9 773 0 823 334
Self-supply 6 921 064 1 042 15 198 0 2 964 000
Rental value 6 921 064 31 750 45 663 0 2 185 000
Property rental 6 921 064 4 416 179 642 0 60 000 000
Property rental 2 6 921 064 81 4 625 0 833 333
Presumed expense (fees and commissions) 6 921 064 3 432 28 431 0 2 400 000
Interest and dividends 6 921 064 91 3 670 0 594 780
Pre-tax income with self-reported interest and dividends 6 921 064 3 239 053 8 365 931 324 666 000 000
Pret-ax income with imputed interest and dividends 6 921 064 9 259 341 227 000 000 324 39 600 000 000
After-tax income with self-reported interest and dividends 6 921 064 3 062 463 6 145 910 324 410 000 000
After-tax income with imputed interest and dividends 6 921 064 6 750 239 136 000 000 324 23 800 000 000
Average tax rate (self-reported interest and dividends) 6 921 064 0 005 0 022 0 0 385
Average tax rate (imputed interest and dividends) 6 921 064 0 008 0 037 0 0 400
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the 2003 National Socioeconomic Survey (casen).
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represented in the survey.23 The average maximum rate 
in the casen survey is 38.5%, higher than the average 
top rate of 37.09% calculated from sii data. If business 
profits are included as part of the personal income tax 
base regardless of whether they are distributed or not, 
the average tax rate rises from 0.5% to 0.78% and the 
average maximum rate increases from 38.5% to 39.9%.
23  Obviously, this could be a simple sampling error.
Table 3 shows descriptive data of the tax database 
from the sii. Each income quantile contains 7,422 or 7,423 
taxpayers. The data consist of tax returns aggregated 
for each of the 1,000 pre-tax income quantiles. The 
average personal income tax rate paid for all taxpayers 
in Chile is 0.626%. The maximum rate is 37.09% in the 
last income quantile, i.e. the one containing the richest 
0.1% of taxpayers in the country. The low average rate 
obviously reflects the fact that the great majority of 
taxpayers have a rate of zero. The average rate rises to 
0.627% when the apv tax benefit is eliminated.
TABLE 3
descriptive statistics based on administrative data  








Nº of taxpayers 1 000 7 422 0 7 422 7 423
Withdrawals (Arts. 14 and 14 bis) 1 000 3 790 000 000 53 300 000 000 0 1 670 000 000 000
Dividends (Arts. 14 and 14 bis) 1 000 268 000 000 2 460 000 000 0 70 600 000 000
Expenses disallowed 1 000 970 000 000 13 600 000 000 0 421 000 000 000
Presumptive income 1 000 296 000 000 675 000 000 0 13 400 000 000
Income per simplified accounts (Art. 14 ter) 1 000 247 000 000 883 000 000 0 18 100 000 000
Professional and directors’ fees 1 000 2 880 000 000 6 750 000 000 0 125 000 000 000
Income from securities, withdrawals of freely 
available surpluses, and capital gains 
1 000 157 000 000 785 000 000 0 19 600 000 000
Income exempted from GC [graduated general 
income] tax 
1 000 36 600 000 344 000 000 0 10 300 000 000
Income art. 42 (salaries, pensions etc.) 1 000 8 500 000 000 27 100 000 000 0 440 000 000 000
Increase in corporate income 1 000 692 000 000 10 400 000 000 0 325 000 000 000
Corporate and property taxes paid 1 000 962 000 000 13 100 000 000 0 405 000 000 000
Capital losses 1 000 65 000 000 254 000 000 0 5 750 000 000
Pension contributions by owners or partners 1 000 2 774 558 16 300 000 0 286 000 000
Mortgage allowances 1 000 429 000 000 1 020 000 000 0 6 150 000 000
Mutual funds and apv 1 000 38 300 000 186 000 000 0 2 230 000 000
gc tax base 1 000 14 500 000 000 46 700 000 000 0 826 000 000 000
Mutual funds 1 000 255 079 2 023 752 0 52 600 000
Ahorro Previsional Voluntario (apv) 1 000 37 900 000 184 000 000 0 2 220 000 000
57 bis (net positive savings) 1 000 5 185 888 38 900 000 0 957 000 000
Global complementario [graduated general 
income] tax
1 000 -59 100 000 3 070 000 000 -3 230 000 000 89 500 000 000
Tax base 1 000 31 500 000 000 105 000 000 000 48 236 2 980 000 000 000
Tax base without deduction of apv 1 000 31 500 000 000 105 000 000 000 48 236 2 980 000 000 000
Tax calculated on tax base 1 000 2 240 000 000 35 600 000 000 0 1 100 000 000 000
Tax calculated on tax base without deduction of apv 1 000 2 250 000 000 35 600 000 000 0 1 110 000 000 000
Average tax rate applicable to tax base 1 000 0.00626 0.02377 0.00000 0.37090
Average tax rate applicable to tax base without 
deduction of apv
1 000 0.00627 0.02384 0.00000 0.37092
apv exemption 1 000 37 900 000 184 000 000 0 2 220 000 000
Source: Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii) database.
Note: under Article 14 ter businesses are taxed on the basis of their cash flow; they may keep simplified accounts and deduct investments and 
inventories as expenses. To be eligible, firms must collect and pay vat, they must have annual sales of less than 5,000 utm (the average for the 
last 3 business years was 3,000 utm until 2008) and their initial capital must be less than 6,000 utm.
c e p a l  r e v i e w  1 0 8  •  d e c e m b e r  2 0 1 2184
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING THE DIFFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT OF BUSINESS AND  
personal income in chile • claudio a. agostini, claudia martínez a. and BarBara Flores
As discussed in the description of the Chilean income 
tax system, there are two main factors reducing the 
progressivity of the income tax. The first is the preferential 
tax treatment of retained profits, especially in the case 
of small businesses that pay taxes only when profits are 
withdrawn. This creates incentives to disguise personal 
income as corporate income and thereby defer or even 
avoid the payment of personal tax. The second is the set 
of tax incentives for personal savings and investment: 
this paper focuses in particular on the apv tax benefits.
Ideally, sii data would be used to analyse the effect 
of these two sources in the reduction of tax progressivity. 
However, sii tax data are available only for personal 
incomes as reported in the personal income tax return 
form. Thus, the information on withdrawals and dividends 
relates only to profits that have been distributed and not 
to those that are retained in firms. Although the sii has 
information on the profits of each business through the 
corporate tax returns, it would be necessary to allocate 
each firm’s retained earnings to each of its owners in 
proportion to their shares in the firm. Such information 
was not available from the sii for purposes of this study, 
nor is it made public. Therefore, the impact of tax 
exemptions and deductions is analysed using data for 
1000 sii quantiles and the impact of the special treatment 
of retained profits using data from the casen survey.
The two empirical analyses presented below make 
the assumption, as do Metcalf (1999) and Altshuler, 
Harris and Toder (2010), that the tax incidence on 
labour income falls on individuals and the incidence of 
corporate income taxes falls on firms.24 It is important to 
note that this assumption about the impact of corporate 
taxes affects, as a practical matter, only the degree of 
progressivity of the tax. Evidence for the United States 
shows that the tax is always progressive, even when the 
burden falls on salaries and wages instead of on capital 
(Harris, 2009).
The basic principle of horizontal equity in tax 
policy simply requires that two individuals receiving 
the same income should pay the same amount in taxes, 
regardless of the source of that income. Complementarily, 
24 Similarly, Altshuler, Harris and Toder (2010) assume that the 
highest tax rates on capital gains and dividends are borne directly by 
the persons reporting this type of income in their tax returns.
the principle of vertical equity holds that persons with 
higher incomes should pay higher taxes on average. 
A tax is progressive, then, if the average tax rate paid 
rises with income.
One of the indices most widely used in the literature 
for quantifying the degree of progressivity of a tax is the 
Suits index (Suits, 1977), which measures progressivity 
using a Lorenz curve for income and tax revenues as 
shown in figure 2.
If the area under the proportional line is defined as 
K and the area under the Lorenz curve as L, the Suits 























Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of administrative data 
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The Suits index has values between -1 and 1. 
Thus, if the tax is proportional then S = 0; if the tax is 
progressive, S > 0; and if the tax is regressive, S < 0. 
The Suits index makes it possible to analyse changes in 
progressivity resulting from changes in tax codes, and 
a re-sampling (“bootstrapping”) statistical technique 
IV
empirical findings
c e p a l  r e v i e w  1 0 8  •  d e c e m b e r  2 0 1 2
distributional effects of eliminating the differential tax treatment of business and  
personal income in chile • claudio a. agostini, claudia martínez a. and barbara flores
185
can then be used to estimate confidence intervals for 
the index. This allows testing hypotheses about changes 
in progressivity due to tax changes (in the tax base or 
in tax rates).
1.  simulations with tax data
The following section presents the effects on income 
distribution of eliminating the apv tax incentive.
The potential distributional effects of this exemption 
depend on the structure of income brackets and of 
marginal income tax rates, as well as on the distribution 
of pre-tax income. Figure 3 shows the average tax rate 
by income quantile, from which it can be seen that the 
fraction of persons paying income taxes in Chile is small. 
If pre-tax income is distributed among 1,000 quantiles, 
only persons in quantiles 824 and higher have a positive 
tax liability. In other words, 82.3% of individuals fall 
below the exemption threshold and, therefore, do not 
pay personal income tax.25 The average tax rate for the 
total population of taxpayers is 0.63%, a figure that 
rises to 3.54% when the population is limited to those 
25  In these circumstances, the existence of seven marginal tax rates 
seems odd.
actually paying taxes. The average top rate is 37.1% for 
the 1,000th quantile.
Figures 4 and 5 show the apv distribution by income 
level. As can be seen from figure 4, the apv is close to 
zero in the first 800 quantiles and is positive in those 
income levels for which the marginal tax rate is greater 
than zero. In both figures, it is clear that the use of apv 
rises with income level, as would be expected since tax 
savings are greater for higher income levels (up to the 
ceiling of 600 uf or 6 utm per year, depending on the 
regime selected). Figure 6 also shows that the ratio of 
apv to pre-tax income also rises with income. In this 
case, the effect of the apv cap becomes clearer: once 
the ceiling is reached and income exceeds that level, the 
apv falls as a proportion of income. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that the average ratio is barely 0.3%.
The evidence on apv use by level of income 
suggests that eliminating this tax benefit would make 
the personal income tax more progressive. However, as 
the apv fraction is low in relation to pre-tax income and 
the great majority of filers are exempted from the tax, 
the distributional impact is limited. This can be seen 
in figure 7, which shows the level of tax exemption 
resulting from the apv for those income quantiles that 
have positive average tax rates.
FIGURE 3
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii).
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FIGURE 4
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii).
Note: the apv variable has been scaled, dividing its value by 100,000.
FIGURE 5
voluntary retirement savings accounts (APV) by  
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii).
Note: the apv variable has been scaled, dividing its value by 100,000.
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FIGURE 6
voluntary retirement savings accounts (APV) as percentage  
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii).
FIGURE 7
APV exemption by income quantile with positive average tax rates





















Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii).
Note: the exemption variable has been scaled, dividing its value by 100,000.
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Table 4 shows the Suits index for the personal 
income tax with and without the apv tax benefit. The 
index declines from 0.67995 to 0.67951, a change that 
is small in magnitude but opposite in direction to what 
would be expected, i.e. towards lesser rather than greater 
progressivity. The change in the index is statistically 
significant. As can be seen in table 4, the zero value 
is not contained in the estimated confidence interval. 
However, in terms of economic rather than statistical 
importance, elimination of the apv tax benefit would 
have no meaningful impact for purposes of changing the 
potential redistributional role of the personal income tax.
One possible explanation for the reduction in the 
progressivity of the personal income tax that results 
from eliminating the apv exemption is the role played 
by the tax benefit cap. For high-income individuals 
who contribute with the maximum apv, the ceiling 
represents a small fraction of their taxable income, and 
consequently their average tax rate would scarcely rise 
if the benefit were eliminated. By contrast, for lower-
income individuals (with positive but low marginal tax 
rates), the apv benefit cap represents a greater fraction 
of their taxable income, and consequently their average 
tax rate would rise significantly if the benefit were 
eliminated. In fact, the increase in the average tax rate 
for the first 10 quantiles of individuals with a positive 
marginal rate is 1.09 percentage points,26 while for the 10 
highest income quantiles it is 0.34 percentage points.27
A situation in which the increased revenue 
from elimination of the apv exemption is distributed 
proportionately among the population is also simulated. 
In this case, the Suits index rises slightly from 0.67995 
to 0.68001. This would indicate that the personal income 
tax has become more progressive. The difference between 
the two indices is statistically significant, as the estimated 
confidence interval does not contain the value zero (see 
26 The average tax rate for these 10 quantiles rises from 0.108% to 
0.110% when the apv exemption is eliminated.








Confidence interval for difference 
between Suits indices
Base case 0.67995      
Without apv exemption 0.67951 -0.0004369 -0.00043689 -0.00043671
Proportional allocation of increase in revenues through 
elimination of apv exemption 
0.68001 0.00006045 0.00006045 0.00006047
Source: prepared by the authors using administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii).
table 4). In economic terms, however, the change in the 
index would have no meaningful distributional effect.
The Suits index is an application of the Gini 
coefficient for measuring tax progressivity. As such, it 
constitutes a measure of average progressivity across 
the entire range of incomes. This must be considered in 
interpreting the index, because there are tax systems that 
can be progressive in one income range and regressive 
in another. In this respect, the Suits index cannot capture 
the more subtle details which require information on 
higher-order moments in the distribution of tax payment 
(variance and kurtosis, for example).
In the case of Chile, changes in tax progressivity 
through the elimination of exemptions and deductions 
or changes in positive marginal tax rates can take place 
only within the income range of that small portion of 
taxpayers who actually pay personal income tax. The 
only tax change that would affect a greater number of 
taxpayers is the reduction of the exempt-income threshold. 
Because the Suits index implicitly gives greater weight 
to the taxes paid by persons who fall in the midrange 
of the distribution, and because in Chile persons who 
fall within this midrange pay no taxes, tax changes that 
merely increase the taxes paid by high-income groups 
—who are at the right-hand end of the distribution— 
cannot be expected to have much impact on the index. 
It can be argued that the Suits index —although it is 
the most widely used in the economic literature and 
in tax policy analysis (Congressional Budget Office, 
1988)— is not the most appropriate one for assessing 
the progressivity of an income tax structure such as the 
Chilean one. However, it is not clear which index would 
be more appropriate because, to date, no other measure 
has been shown to be superior to the Suits index for 
this purpose.28
28  Seetharaman and Iyer (1995) have criticized the seven most widely 
used indices of tax progressivity, including the Suits index. Similarly, 
Kiefer (1984) identified inconsistencies in various progressivity indices 
that have been proposed. Finally, Greene and Balkan (1987) compared 
various indices used in the academic literature. 
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2.  simulations with data from CASEN survey
Using data from the 2003 casen survey, which contains 
specific information on all sources of individual income 
(wages and salaries, rent, interest, capital gains, dividends, 
profits withdrawals from businesses, capital income), 
a change in the tax base for dividends and profits that 
involves a shift from distributed profits to accrued profits 
was simulated. This change in the tax base maintains 
the integration of the corporate tax with the personal 
income tax, whereby a credit against personal income 
tax is granted for corporate tax paid on accrued profits. 
In this way, the final income tax rate is the personal rate 
paid by the firm’s owner or shareholders.
The survey data do not show which fraction of the 
profits is distributed and which portion is maintained as 
retained earnings. For simulation purposes, then, it is 
assumed that the total of retained earnings estimated by 
Jorrat (2009) is proportional to the dividends reported 
by each individual in the casen survey. In this way, an 
amount of retained earnings is imputed to each individual 
in proportion to the dividends received.29 Then, the 
individual’s pre-tax income and the taxes that would 
have to be paid according to the two different tax bases 
(distributed profits and accrued profits) are calculated.30
29  The annual interest and dividends received by individuals are 
calculated and their share in total interest and dividends received by 
the population are estimated. Then the 450,625,000,000 pesos of tax 
expenditure estimated by the Research Branch of the Internal Revenue 
Service for the year 2003 (Tax Expenditure Report, December 2004) 
are allocated among individuals according to each person’s share in 
total interest and dividends. 
30  The Suits index is not used to examine the progressivity impact of 
tax reforms with casen survey data. There are two reasons for this: 
first, the progressivity of the income tax in Chile depends critically 
on the increase of the average tax rate of those who pay this tax, 
in line with increases in their incomes. However, as only 17.3% of 
income recipients pay income tax, the progressivity of the tax depends 
Table 5 shows the average tax rate for each percentile 
of income before and after this change in the tax base. 
As can be appreciated from the table, there are two 
significant implications. The first is that many taxpayers 
below the 86th percentile will now pay a positive tax 
rate, whereas before the reform they paid no taxes. 
This reveals the scope of the horizontal inequity that 
currently exists in the tax base: in fact, many taxpayers 
who would have to pay taxes in light of their income 
level are able to defer those taxes because their main 
sources of income are the profits of firms of which they 
are owners. If these taxpayers had the same level of 
income but derived solely from wages and salaries, they 
would pay tax in accordance with the current tax base, as 
that base would not be changed through the addition of 
corporate profits. The second implication of this reform 
is that those taxpayers who now pay personal income 
tax would face a much higher marginal tax rate, as they 
would move into a higher income bracket. A tax reform 
such as that simulated in this study would certainly spark 
a behavioural response from taxpayers, who would try to 
reduce their tax burden (by working less, for example). 
Consequently, the change in progressivity resulting from 
this tax reform must be considered as the maximum 
change that could be obtained by shifting the tax base 
from distributed to accrued profits.
exclusively on what happens in the tail of the distribution. In the 
second place, the casen survey, with its primary focus on poverty, 
contains proportionately fewer observations in the upper tail of the 
distribution than do the sii population data. Despite these limitations, 
it is possible to calculate and report the average income tax rates as a 
correct approximation for quantifying the income distribution effects 
of a tax reform, but it is not possible to correctly measure the total 
progressivity of the income tax using the Suits index. These problems 
mean that, in calculating the Suits index with casen survey data, an 
index of about 0.23 is obtained, and this does not coincide with the 
Suits indices calculated from the sii date, which include the total 
population of taxpayers.
TABLE 5
average tax rate by income percentile, before and after tax reform 
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This paper has examined the distributional effect of 
the main exemptions and deductions in the Chilean 
income tax. In addition to the casen survey, which is a 
well-known database widely used in several studies, an 
exclusive tax data generated by the sii was used.
The tax data show that 82% of individuals are 
exempted from the personal income tax owing to 
their income level and the structure of the income tax 
brackets and marginal tax rates. In this context, our 
empirical analysis shows that the apv exemption has no 
meaningful economic effect on the progressivity of the 
income tax. Although those who take advantage of these 
exemptions and deductions are the individuals with the 
highest incomes, and although the use of that exemption 
rises with income, the relatively small magnitude of 
the tax benefits vis-à-vis income and the fact that few 
people face a positive tax rate implies that abolishing 
these benefits would do very little to make the income 
tax more progressive.
A different finding emerges when considering a 
tax reform that eliminates the most important benefit 
in terms of tax expenditure: that whereby the profits of 
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firms are taxed only when they are distributed to the 
owners. Based on casen survey data, and assuming a 
conservative scenario for profit distribution, a change 
was simulated in the corporate tax that would shift the 
payment of taxes to an accrual rather than a distributed 
basis but would maintain its integration with the personal 
income tax. The results of this empirical analysis show 
that a tax reform of this kind has a significant impact 
in terms of increasing the progressivity of the personal 
income tax and reducing after-tax income inequality.
The results of this study provide a useful and 
relevant analytical framework for understanding the 
income tax system in Chile and its potential as a tool for 
redistribution. In the first place, the fact that only 16.6% 
of taxpayers are subject to a positive tax rate means that 
any tax exemption will benefit higher-income groups. 
This limits the potential of income taxes as a tool for 
reducing the great income inequality prevalent in the 
country, and for that reason it should create public and 
parliamentary debate over the drawbacks of introducing 
exemptions in the income tax. Any exemption not only 
generates inefficiencies and incentivizes evasion, but also 
consistently favours the richest 10% of the population. 
In the second place, given the small proportion of 
persons who actually pay taxes, the only changes with 
the potential to achieve a more progressive tax system 
are those that will affect large-scale tax benefits. One 
such change would be to eliminate the favourable tax 
treatment of the retained profits of businesses. In the third 
place, the fact that the elimination of tax exemptions 
has no great impact on the progressivity of the personal 
income tax does not mean that this cannot be used as 
a tool for income redistribution. The conclusion is that 
greater changes are needed in the current tax structure 
in order to make it an effective tool. One aspect for 
debate concerning the structure is the current level of 
exempted income, as a result of which nearly 83% of 
the population does not have to pay any income taxes.
This work could be extended in a number of 
useful ways which depend, unfortunately, on access to 
data supplied by the tax administration. In particular, 
there is room for a more detailed analysis of the other 
exemptions, credits and deductions that now exist in 
both the personal income tax and the corporate tax, not 
only to describe their distributional effects, but also to 
estimate their effects on individual taxpayer behaviour.
TABLE 6
percentage increase in taxable income and taxes paid  
after eliminating the APV exemption, by percentile
(Tax-paying percentiles)
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii).
apv: Ahorro Previsional Voluntario [voluntary retirement savings account].
Table 6 (concluded)
c e p a l  r e v i e w  1 0 8  •  d e c e m b e r  2 0 1 2196
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING THE DIFFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT OF BUSINESS AND  
personal income in chile • claudio a. agostini, claudia martínez a. and BarBara Flores
TABLE 7
share of total taxes paid by percentile before and after eliminating the APV 
(Tax-paying percentiles)
Percentile
Share of total tax paid (percentage)
Percentage change
With apv exemption Without apv exemption
824 0.000 0.000 21.30
825 0.001 0.001 8.75
826 0.001 0.001 0.18
827 0.001 0.001 0.45
828 0.002 0.002 -0.05
829 0.002 0.002 1.35
830 0.003 0.003 -0.13
831 0.003 0.003 0.84
832 0.004 0.004 -0.21
833 0.004 0.004 0.11
834 0.004 0.005 1.19
835 0.005 0.005 -0.28
836 0.005 0.005 -0.19
837 0.006 0.006 -0.04
838 0.006 0.006 -0.02
839 0.007 0.007 -0.23
840 0.007 0.007 0.24
841 0.008 0.008 -0.22
842 0.008 0.008 -0.16
843 0.009 0.009 -0.28
844 0.009 0.009 -0.18
845 0.010 0.010 -0.30
846 0.010 0.010 -0.25
847 0.011 0.011 -0.15
848 0.011 0.011 -0.28
849 0.012 0.012 -0.04
850 0.012 0.012 -0.17
851 0.013 0.013 0.24
852 0.013 0.013 -0.24
853 0.014 0.014 -0.17
854 0.015 0.014 -0.29
855 0.015 0.015 -0.31
856 0.016 0.016 -0.05
857 0.016 0.016 -0.28
858 0.017 0.017 0.00
859 0.017 0.017 -0.21
860 0.018 0.018 -0.23
861 0.019 0.019 -0.23
862 0.019 0.019 -0.30
863 0.020 0.020 -0.14
864 0.020 0.020 -0.26
865 0.021 0.021 -0.30
866 0.022 0.022 -0.26
867 0.022 0.022 -0.27
868 0.023 0.023 -0.28
869 0.024 0.024 -0.26
870 0.024 0.024 -0.25
871 0.025 0.025 -0.25
872 0.026 0.026 -0.27
873 0.026 0.026 -0.25
874 0.027 0.027 -0.15
875 0.028 0.028 -0.26
876 0.029 0.028 -0.25
877 0.029 0.029 -0.22
878 0.030 0.030 -0.26
879 0.031 0.031 -0.28
880 0.032 0.032 -0.19
881 0.032 0.032 -0.17
882 0.033 0.033 -0.25
883 0.034 0.034 -0.16
884 0.035 0.035 -0.27
885 0.036 0.036 -0.17
886 0.037 0.036 -0.16
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Percentile
Share of total tax paid (percentage)
Percentage change
With apv exemption Without apv exemption
887 0.037 0.037 -0.26
888 0.038 0.038 -0.14
889 0.039 0.039 -0.23
890 0.040 0.040 -0.26
891 0.041 0.041 -0.11
892 0.042 0.042 -0.19
893 0.043 0.043 -0.15
894 0.044 0.044 -0.18
895 0.045 0.045 -0.31
896 0.046 0.046 -0.27
897 0.047 0.047 -0.15
898 0.048 0.048 -0.31
899 0.049 0.049 -0.23
900 0.050 0.050 -0.14
901 0.051 0.051 -0.26
902 0.052 0.052 -0.20
903 0.054 0.053 -0.30
904 0.055 0.055 -0.25
905 0.056 0.056 -0.28
906 0.057 0.057 -0.28
907 0.058 0.058 -0.27
908 0.060 0.059 -0.28
909 0.061 0.061 -0.26
910 0.062 0.062 -0.21
911 0.063 0.063 -0.16
912 0.065 0.065 -0.26
913 0.066 0.066 -0.19
914 0.067 0.067 -0.29
915 0.069 0.069 -0.14
916 0.070 0.070 -0.17
917 0.071 0.071 -0.27
918 0.073 0.073 -0.29
919 0.074 0.074 -0.27
920 0.076 0.076 -0.22
921 0.077 0.077 -0.20
922 0.079 0.079 -0.19
923 0.080 0.080 -0.27
924 0.082 0.082 -0.17
925 0.084 0.084 -0.17
926 0.085 0.085 -0.25
927 0.087 0.087 -0.21
928 0.089 0.089 -0.12
929 0.091 0.091 -0.24
930 0.093 0.093 -0.21
931 0.095 0.095 -0.14
932 0.097 0.097 -0.20
933 0.099 0.099 -0.16
934 0.101 0.101 -0.13
935 0.103 0.103 -0.20
936 0.105 0.105 -0.12
937 0.108 0.107 -0.27
938 0.110 0.110 -0.22
939 0.112 0.112 -0.15
940 0.117 0.117 0.07
941 0.122 0.122 0.14
942 0.128 0.128 -0.01
943 0.133 0.133 0.18
944 0.138 0.138 -0.08
945 0.144 0.144 -0.11
946 0.150 0.150 0.05
947 0.156 0.156 0.02
948 0.163 0.163 0.05
949 0.169 0.169 -0.03
950 0.176 0.176 0.08
951 0.183 0.183 -0.03
952 0.190 0.190 0.01
Table 7 (continued)
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Percentile
Share of total tax paid (percentage)
Percentage change
With apv exemption Without apv exemption
953 0.198 0.197 -0.02
954 0.205 0.205 -0.13
955 0.213 0.213 -0.04
956 0.221 0.221 0.10
957 0.229 0.229 -0.02
958 0.238 0.238 -0.11
959 0.247 0.247 -0.05
960 0.257 0.257 -0.04
961 0.267 0.267 -0.02
962 0.277 0.277 0.01
963 0.287 0.287 -0.08
964 0.298 0.298 0.01
965 0.309 0.309 -0.02
966 0.321 0.321 -0.03
967 0.333 0.333 0.05
968 0.346 0.345 -0.05
969 0.359 0.358 -0.01
970 0.372 0.372 -0.02
971 0.387 0.388 0.25
972 0.409 0.410 0.33
973 0.432 0.433 0.19
974 0.456 0.458 0.27
975 0.481 0.482 0.16
976 0.507 0.507 0.12
977 0.534 0.535 0.10
978 0.563 0.564 0.18
979 0.593 0.594 0.22
980 0.624 0.625 0.14
981 0.658 0.660 0.16
982 0.694 0.695 0.19
983 0.731 0.733 0.17
984 0.770 0.771 0.13
985 0.822 0.826 0.57
986 0.895 0.900 0.53
987 0.973 0.980 0.67
988 1.062 1.068 0.54
989 1.161 1.167 0.53
990 1.269 1.275 0.46
991 1.388 1.395 0.52
992 1.535 1.546 0.68
993 1.735 1.744 0.52
994 1.978 1.988 0.48
995 2.280 2.291 0.50
996 2.659 2.672 0.48
997 3.257 3.272 0.48
998 4.182 4.202 0.50
999 6.034 6.050 0.27
1000 49.317 49.167 -0.30
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii).
apv: Ahorro Previsional Voluntario [voluntary retirement savings account].
TABLE 8
change in total revenues from eliminating exemptions 
Revenue Millions of pesos Percent change from base situation 
Base case 2 240 000  
Without apv exemption 2 250 000 0.4
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (sii).
Table 7 (concluded)
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FIGURE 8

















Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the 2003 National Socioeconomic Survey (casen).
FIGURE 9
average tax rate by income percentile with self-reported interest  
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the 2003 National Socioeconomic Survey (casen).
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FIGURE 10
average tax rate by income percentile with  
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the 2003 National Socioeconomic Survey (casen).
FIGURE 11
average tax rate by income percentile with imputed interest  
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the 2003 National Socioeconomic Survey (casen).
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